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INTRODUCTION
The term "democratizing capital" in this book's title has two related meanings, and the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") democratizes capital in
both ways.1The first may be analogized to voting. The CRA has democratized
decisions about the distribution of capital by extending at least part of the decision-making "franchise" to previously "disenfranchised" people, in particular low-income and minority persons.2 Second, the CRA has played a role in
distributing loans to people-particularly low-income and minority individuals-who previously did not receive loans, thus including them in the economic mainstream and giving them the same economic opportunity as others.3The CRA has done this by influencing banks to make loans to low-income
and minority individuals to purchase, refinance, or improve a home; to open
or expand a small business; or to support a small farm. 4
The seeds for democratizing capital are contained in the statute that enacted the CRA. The CRA imposes o n banks a "continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they
are chartered;'s including low- and moderate-income ("LMI") neighborhoods.6 The CRA places enforcement of this obligation in the hands of four
federal administrative agencies that regulate banks (the "federal banking agencies" or the "agencies") .7 The CRA requires these agencies to examine each
bank periodically to determine whether it is helping to meet community credit
needs, to issue a written public report-including a rating-evaluating the
bank's CRA performance, and to take the bank's CRA record into account
when considering certain bank expansion applications.a When a bank files one
of these expansion applications, any member of the public may file comments
with the federal banking agency that regulates the bank opposing the application on the basis that the bank has failed to meet its CRA obligations. Members of the public, and in particular community-based organizations operating in LMI, predominantly minority, and inner-city neighborhoods
(collectively "redlined neighborhoods") have used this opportunity to file comments opposing bank merger applications.
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The seeds for democratizing capital have borne fruit. The opportunity for
disenfran chised m embers of redlined neighborhoods to comment o n a bank's
CRA record when it files an expansion application has given them a powerful
voice in decisions about the distribution of loans. 9 Banks, which are generally
sensitive to bad publicity and risk-averse in their expansion applications, are
anxious to have good CRA records both as good public relations and to ensure approval of their expansion applications. Public comments, and the delay
and risk they cause to bank expansion plans, have brought banks to the bargaining table with community groups, resulting in bank pledges to lend more
than one trillion dollars to LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods
nationwide.10 Even if banks do not have expansion plans in the immediate future, their desire for good public relations, their discovery that CRA-related
lending can be profitable, and their desire to prevent comments opposing future expansion applications have motivated them to change their lending practices, introduce new loan products, and partner with community groups to
make lendjng to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods _part of their
business strategies.
Despite its success in democratizing capital, the CRA has no t reached its
full potential. There remains a disproportionate distribution of costly subprime lending in LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods and a disproportionate percentage of low-income persons who do not participate in
the bankjng system.
The thesis of this book has four parts. First, one of the main reasons the
CRA has not reached its full potential for democratizing capital is that the federal bankjng agencies utilize subjective standards for evaluating the CRA performance of banks. Such standards limit the power of the franchise the CRJ\
extends to LMI and minority persons and the amount of capital they receive
because subjective standards make it difficult to hold a bank accountable for
a poor CRA record or to know how much lending a bank should be doing.
Second, in contrast to subjective standards for evaluating CRA performance, a fixed set of criteria composed of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative measures of community credit needs, and objective standards
for evaluating bank lending would maximize the CRA's potential for democratizing capital. Such criteria would make it easier to hold a bank accountable
for a poor CRA record and would more clearly define how much lending a
bank should be doing.
Third, a major reason the agencies have failed to adopt quantitative measures and objective standards for evaluating CRA performance is the agencies'

fear that such standards would "allocate credit." The CRA's legislative history
makes clear that Congress did not intend the CRA to allocate credit, and the
agencies fear credit allocation could lead to unsafe and unsound banking practices.
The fourth part of the thesis is that it is possible to establish criteria for
evaluating CRA performance that are composed of quantitative measures and
objective standards that maximize the CRA's potential for democratizing capital without allocating credit. The CRA performance evaluation criteria this
book proposes in chapter eight have been developed based on the notion that
while the CRA is not in tended to allocate credit, it is intended to in fluence
banks to lend more money in redlined neighborhoods, and it is permissible
under the CRA to influence banks to lend in such areas up to the point of allocating credit.
Specifically, the CRA evaluative criteria this book proposes are composed
of three characteristics that will maximize the CRA's potential for democratizing capital: quantitative measures of bank lending; quantitative benchmarks
of community credit needs; and objective standards for determining whether
bank lending meets credit needs. Such criteria would make it possible for
community groups to hold banks accountable for poor CRA records and
would help ensure that banks are distributing sufficient capital to meet community credit needs.
The reason the CRA has not met its potential fo r democratizing capital and
exploring how it might do so is the story this book tries to tell. The story begins in chapter one, with the legislative history of the CRA. Congress passed
the CRA to influence banks to make loans to redlined neighborhoods. Congress intended the CRA to eliminate the bankjng practice known as "redlin'.ng;' which is the refusal to lend in low-income, predominantly minority, or
mner-city neighborhoods, regardless of credit risk, 11 and to increase bank
lending in these neighborhoods. When Congress amended the CRA and other
bankjng laws with CRA-related provisions on six separate occasions, it took a
number of steps to strengthen the CRA's extension of the franchise over decisions about the distribution of capital, primarily through expanding the
amount and quality of information about bank lending records that is available to the public. While Congress intended the CRA to influence banks to
make more loans to redlined neighborhoods, Congress also stated that it did
not intend the CRA to allocate credit, another way of stating that the CRA was
no~ to ~e used to create lending quotas. Congress did not ban quotas, but the
leg1slat1ve history indicates that quotas are not permissible under the CRA.
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Based on this legislative history, the federal banking agencies may adopt criteria for evaluating CRA performance that influence banks to lend up to the
point of setting quotas.
Chapter two describes the structure of the CRA. Reflecting its legislative
history, the CRA is designed to influence banks to lend more money in underserved neighborhoods without allocating credit. The CRA places an obligation on banks to help meet community credit needs. It creates an enforcement mechanism that influences banks to make loans to satisfy this obligation.
Enforcement comes in the form of periodic evaluations of a bank's CR.A
record by the federal banking agency that regulates it, public disclosure of information about a bank's CRA record, and scrutiny of a bank's CRA record
by the agency that regulates it when the bank submits an expansion application. The CRA does not, however, contain enforcement provisions that might
lead to credit allocation, such as mandatory penalties for a bank that fails to
satisfy its CRA obligations or the right of individuals to sue in court for CR.A
violations.
The story then moves, in chapter three, to the first CRA enforcement
regime, which lasted from 1978 through mid-1997. In enforcing the CRA, the
federal banking agencies-all of which had opposed the CRA-did not em·
phasize the portion of the CRA or its legislative history that focused on in·
creasing lending to redlined neighborhoods. Instead, they focused on the portion of the legislative history that prohibited credit allocation. The agencies
treated the CRA as a law that was intended to correct an information failure
in the market. According to this theory, banks redlined because they decided
it was not worth the expense or time to seek creditworthy borrowers in particular neighborhoods, especially LMI, inner-city, or predominantly minority communities. The agencies' perspective was that the CRA requires banks
to seek information about lending opportunities in redlined neighborhoods
and market loans there. The first set of CRA regulations, which were in force
from 1978 through mid-1997, reflected this position. The criteria for evaluating CRA performance in the regulations and the agencies' enforcement of
the CRA emphasized the efforts a bank undertook to make loans in its local
community. 12 A bank's actual lending was of secondary importance to its efforts to lend. When the agencies evaluated bank lending, they used vague and
inconsistent criteria and subjective standards that made it impossible for members of the public to know what a bank's CRA obligations were, let alone hold
a bank to them.
Over time, the first CRA enforcement regime generated great dissatisfaction. The regime had the unfortunate distinction of generating dissension
among the banks it regulated, the residents of redlined neighborhoods that it
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Was intended to benefit, and the law's enforcers, the federal banking agencies
~hemselves. 1 3 They all agreed that the CRA was enforced in an arbitrary and
tnconsistent manner. Bankers complained that it generated unnecessary burden and paperwork and subjected bank expansion plans to undue delay and
expense. Community groups asserted that the federal banking agencies did
not fulfill their responsibility to enforce the CRA and that the standards for
evaluating bank lending were too vague and subjective to allow them to hold
a bank accountable for a poor record of meeting community credit needs.
In response to the many criticisms of the first CRA enforcement regime,
the federal banking agencies began a rule-making process in July 1993 that
~ulminated in new CRA regulations in April 1995 that were fully phased in by
;ly 1997. Chapter four describes the efforts to reform the CRA regulations.
. he new regulations made some improvements and some progress towards
1
'.11Plementing criteria for evaluating CRA performance that consist of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community
credit needs, and objective terms for evaluating bank performance. Specifi~ally, the second set of CRA regulations eliminated the criteria that evaluated
le~n~ effo.rts to lend and replaced them with criteria that ev~uated a _bank's
b ding, investment, and service performance. The regulat10ns requlfe the
ederal banking agencies to consider the extent of the bank's lending in its
community, the geographic distribution of its loans, and its lending to pers~ns of different income levels. However, the regulations do not spell out
c earJy and unambiguously how to measure bank lending, how to measure
corninunity credit needs, or how to evaluate whether the lending meets credit
~~~ds. Thus, despite the improvement, the new regulations fall short of fulling the capital-democratizing promise of the CRA.
The first proposed draft of the new regulations, however, came very close
to un
11 .
z111g quantitative measures and benchmarks and objective standards for
evaluating CRA performance. It had a "market share" test, which would have
evaluated a bank's record of meeting community credit needs by comparing
a bank's market share of loans in LMI neighborhoods (quantitative measure
of bank lending) with its overall market share of loans (quantitative bench:ark of the bank's ability to meet overall community credit needs). If the
ank's market share in LMI neighborhoods was "comparable" to its overall
~arket share, it presumably was meeting community credit needs. There was
a so a loan-to-deposit ratio ("LDR") test, pursuant to which the percentage of
~ bank's deposits that it returned to the community in the form of loans
bquantitative measure) would be compared with a 65% LDR (quantitative
enchmark). An LDR of 65% was presumably reasonable (a quasi-objective
standard). Finally, the proposed regulations evaluated the percentage of a
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bank's loans in its community (quantitative measure) . If a majority of loans
were in the bank's community (quantitative benchmark), this was "appropriate." The banking industry criticized the market share and LDR tests as allocating credit, and the federal banking agencies dropped them from the final
regulations.
The failure of the federal banking agencies to adopt CRA regulations that
use criteria for evaluating CRA performance composed of quantitative measures and objective standards means the CRA still has a long way to go before
reaching its potential for democratizing capital. This is borne out in chapter
five, which investigates how the federal banking agencies have implemented
the second set of CRA regulations. Chapter five examines CRA performance
evaluations, agency decisions on bank expansion applications, and the agencies' CRA examination manuals and other regulatory materials. Despite improvements in the second set of CRA regulations, the agencies continue to enforce the CRA in a way that makes it nearly impossible for community groups
to hold a bank accountable for a poor lending record. The agencies did not
use a fixed set of CRA evaluative criteria, frequently employed criteria consisting of a quantitative measure of bank lending and a quantitative benchmark of community credit needs but used subjective standards to compare
bank lending with the benchmark, did not define the level of performance required to meet a particular subjective standard, used the subjective evaluative
standards inconsistently and almost always in a way that favored banks, and
did not define the weight each criterion had. The agencies' decisions on expansion applications similarly did not use a fixed set of criteria and used subjective standards for evaluating bank lending. The decisions generally listed
facts about the bank's lending, emphasized strengths and excused weaknesses,
and did not describe the reasoning the agency employed in reaching the decision. Finally, the compliance manuals do not require banking agency examiners to use a fixed set of criteria when evaluating a bank's CRA performance.
The story next moves to chapter six, which examines the impact the CRA
has had on distributing loans to LMI and minority persons and neighborhoods. There is substantial evidence consistent with the conclusion that the
CRA has encouraged banks to lend more money to LMI and minority persons
and neighborhoods than they would have without the CRA. Nevertheless,
there is evidence that the CRA has not realized its potential. LMI and minority neighborhoods receive a disproportionate share of costly subprime and
predatory loans; many residents of such neighborhoods who received sub-
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prime loans could have received a prime loan; and a large percentage of the
LMI persons do not even have a bank account.
The book then moves to its final two chapters, which examine whether it
is possible to create CRA evaluative criteria that do not allocate credit and are
composed of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks
of community credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating whether
bank lending meets community credit needs. Chapter seven examines other
federal government interventions in the credit markets in order to define credit
allocation more specifically and to distinguish governmental credit allocation
from governmental efforts to influence bank lending decisions. Several examples show this difference, including the Department of Justice's enforcement of the fair-lending laws, laws and regulations governing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, laws establishing lending requirements for banks with interstate
branches, and home mortgage-lending disclosure laws.
Finally, chapter eight proposes CRA evaluative criteria that maximize the
CR.Ns potential for democratizing capital. The criteria are composed of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community
credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating whether bank lending
meets community credit needs. Chapter eight demonstrates that the proposed
criteria will strengthen the franchise over lending decisions that the CRA extends to previously disenfranchised community members, will influence banks
to lend more money to LMI and minority persons previously excluded from
the economic system, and will not allocate credit.

CHAPTER ONE

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE

CRA

Introduction
The legislative history of the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA'') shows
that the purpose of the CRA was to end the bank practice known as redlining-refusing to lend in certain neighborhoods, especially low-income, predominantly minority, and inner-city neighborhoods- due to perceived credit
risks, and to increase the amount of money banks lend in their local communities in general and in redlined neighborhoods in particular. ' The CRA
expresses a congressional preference for banks to make loans in their local
communities and in LMI neighborhoods and threatens sanctions for banks
that do not comply. In using the CRA to express a preference and threaten
sanctions, Congress intended to influence banks to lend more money in redlined neighborhoods.
The legislative history of the CRA also shows that in passing the CRA,
Congress did not intend to create a system of government-imposed credit allocation, and equated credit allocation with lending quotas. Congress did not
establish lending quotas, require banks to lend to particular persons or organizations, or create mandatory sanctions for failing to lend.
Based on the legislative history, the four federal agencies that regulate
banks2 (the "federal banking agencies" or the "agencies") may promulgate CRA
regulations that contain criteria for evaluating the CRA performance of a bank
that consist of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community credit needs, and objective standards for evaluating
whether bank lending meets community credit needs.3
. Th~ difference between allocating credit and influencing bank lending decisions is not just semantic. It is the difference between setting mandatory quo-

11

12

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CRA

tas-which Congress did not do in passing the CRA- and setting up a system
intended to end redlining and increase lending in redlined communities, which
Congress did in passing the CRA. Former Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence
Lindsey made a statement that makes this distinction between influencing
banks to lend and allocating credit through quotas: "The CRA established a national goal and put considerable power in both supervisory agencies and the
public to enforce it but left the details of how the goal should be accomplished
to local communities and depository institutions."4 The CRA influences banks
to lend in redlined neighborhoods but does not specify amounts, types, terms,
or recipients of loans. As Lindsey continued, "No one in Washington has yet
been employed to decide how much or what type of CRA lending should be
made in the individual communities . . . [banks] represent." 5
Congress passed six significant amendments to the CRA and three CRA-related amendments to other banking laws on six separate occasions. The provisions and legislative histories of the amendments on the first five occasions
indicate they were congressional attempts to clarify and strengthen the CRA's
influence over bank lending decisions. They helped democratize capital by requiring the federal banking agencies to disclose more information to the public about bank lending records and the standards the agencies use to evaluate
them. The purpose of the amendments Congress passed on the sixth occasion
it amended the CRA and related laws is mixed. On the one hand, the amendments strengthened the CRA by prohibiting banks from going into the insurance or securities businesses unless they have at least a satisfactory CRA record.
On the other hand, they weakened the CRA by limiting the frequency of CRA
exams for small banks with satisfactory or better CRA records. The amendments
also included a provision requiring community groups and banks to disclose
certain CRA-related agreements they enter. While the purpose of this amendment might have been to create a chilling effect on groups' efforts to comment
on bank applications, it is not clear the amendment will have this effect.

The Purpose of the CRA
Congress passed the CRA in light of evidence that banks were engaged in
two interrelated practices- redlining and capital export- which, CRA's supporters argued, contributed to the deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods. 6
Redlining is the practice by which a bank draws a red line around a neighborhood on a map and refuses to lend there because of perceived credit risks
associated with the neighborhood.7 Capital export is the practice by which a
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~~t~ :xpdorts the depos'.ts of one neighborhood's residents to other commu-

portun~iesm~kes loans. m t~ose other communities despite local lending op-
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Similarly, Congress indicated that the success of federal development prograJJ15
"depends in large part upon the availability of private capital, particularly as
made available through local lending and financial institutions." 44 As Senator
Proxmire stated, "[I] t is possible that the Federal Government may put in 3
few billion dollars this year or over the next few years to help rebuild our citi~5·
But it will be peanuts compared to what the financial institutions can put 111'
if they have the will to do it."4 S
.
When he introduced the CRA, Senator Proxmire justified the effort to in·
fluence banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods as a quid pro quo. 46 He stated
that the public charter that banks receive justifies imposing public obligatioJlS
·n
on banks.47 "[A] public charter conveys numerous economic benefits an d 1
return it is legitimate for public policy and regulatory practice to require so~'.
public purpose ... ." 48 He listed several benefits of a bank charter. Banks enJ 0l
protection against competition from other businesses. Banks hold a "semi-et
elusive franchise:' 49 Senator proxmire elaborated, "The Government limits the
entry of other potential competitors into that area if such entry would u~dul~
jeopardize existing financial institutions."so The government also restncte
"competition [among banks] by limiting the rate of interest payable on sav·
ings deposits and prohibiting any interest on demand deposits."s1 The gov·
ernment provides low-cost deposit insurance.s2 Finally, the governmeJl;
provides low-cost credit through the Federal Reserve Banks and the Feder3
Home Loan Banks. S3

CRA Enforcement
Criteria for Evaluating a Bank's Record of Meeting
Community Credit Needs
The legislative history contains a discussion about how to evaluate a banJ<'S
record of meeting the credit needs of the community. This discussion shed~
light on the difference between allocating credit and influencing banks to leJl
31
more in redlined neighborhoods, further supports the proposition th
Congress intended the CRA to influence banks to lend in redlined neighbof'
hoods, and provides some guidance regarding criteria for evaluating CRA pef'
1
formance that influence banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods but do n°
allocate credit.
·i
As initially introdu ced, the CRA included a mandatory loan -to-dep0 51
ratio fo r evaluating a bank's record at m eeting local credit needs. The cJVI

would have required banks to indicate, subject to regulatory approval, the percentage of their deposits that they would lend in their local communities.s4
J-_Iowever, Senator Proxmire dropped this provision in light of strong opposit10n that this mandatory loan-to-deposit ratio would have constituted credit
allocation.ss
The CRA's subsequent legislative history contains suggestions of the sorts
of criteria the agencies could utilize in evaluating the CRA performance of a
bank. Although not explicit, the discussions imply that it wou ld be appropria_te to adopt criteria for evaluating CRA performance composed of quantitative measures of bank lending, quantitative benchmarks of community credit
1
'. eeds, and objective standards for evaluating bank lending. For example, there
is a suggestion that a bank's lending could be evaluated by comparing its per~ormance to demand, measured by all loan applications received by all banks
111
the community and the number of loans banks m ake in the community.s6
The legislative history also suggests a quasi-objective standard for evaluating
whether a bank's lending meets community credit needs: whether the bank is
lending a "disproportionate" amount of credit outside the comm unity.57
Alt_hough the term "disproportionate" is not precise and is open to interpretation, the legislative history contains some guidance about its meaning. The
Senate Report states that although Congress "rejected the course of setting percentage targets for reinvestment, it should be self-evident that an institution
~xporting 99 percent of its dollars outside of the city in which it is chartered
IS not serving community convenience and needs."s8 The Report contin ues
that, in contrast, some savings and loans had been able to lend 80% of their
deposits locally with no adverse effects on bank safety and soundness.s9 The
r~port cited one bank that had gone from making 1% of its loans within its
city to 20%. 60 In the Senate debates on the CRA, Senator Proxmire stated that
Brooklyn and Washington, D.C. were suffering from disinvestment; banks in
those areas were lending 89% and 90% of their deposits, respectively, elsewhe'.e·61 Finally, a colloquy between Senator Proxmire and Vincent J. Quinn,
pres 1.?~nt and chairman of the board of the Brooklyn Savings Bank, suggests
th_a t disproportionate" might be defined by comparing a bank's performance
with other ba~s' performances based on their relative sizes. Accord ing to
Senator ~roxm1re, Brooklyn Savings Bank, with $1.1 billion in assets, made
52 ~oans 111 Brooklyn in 1975, compared with the smaller GreenPoint Bank
which made 722 loans. 62 ~uinn defended Brooklyn Savings Bank by assertin~
th~t .there was not suffici ent demand fo r loans in Brooklyn for all banks to
originate the same percentage of their assets in loans 1·n B kl
G
p ·
roo yn as
reen omt Bank.63 Proxmire responded by stating "[W]I
'
1en you compare
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these, it looks as if this bank [GreenPoint] was more aggressive and active and
serviced its community more effectively than your large bank did." 64
Arthur Burns, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, outlined similar
criteria the federal banking agencies would have to utilize if the CRA were enacted.65 The federal banking agencies would have to identify the credit needs
of the community, determine the extent to which they were being met, and
determine whether a particular bank was doing its share. Burns opposed the
CRA on the grounds that this would be unduly burdensome. 66

Sanctions for Failing to Meet Community Credit Needs
Another way the legislative history of the CRA sheds light on the difference
between allocating credit and influencing bank lending decisions and further
indicates that Congress did not intend to allocate credit but did intend to influence banks to lend in underserved neighborhoods is Congress' consideration of sanctions for banks that do not satisfy their CRA obligations. Instead
of imposing the sort of mandatory lending orders on a bank for failing to satisfy its CRA obligations that would accompany credit allocation, the sanction
was "relatively weak."67 Senator Proxmire stated, "You're not going to put a
bank out of business if they don't loan locally."68 Congress intended the federal banking agencies to use their authority to "encourage financial institu·
tions to help meet local credit needs."69
Despite the fact that there were no mandatory sanctions, the agencies' encouragement was to be strong. The CRA required the federal banking agencies to "use the full extent of their authority .. . to encourage all regulated
depository institutions' responsiveness to community needs." 70 Representative
Ashley, a CRA supporter in the House, stated that the CRA "reaffirms and
strengthens the powers of the federal financial supervisory agencies to assure
that federally regulated financial institutions meet the credit needs of their
communities."71
The legislative history indicates that this regulatory encouragement was to
be both formal and informal. As to formal encouragement, the federal bank
ing agencies would use their authority when examining banks and considering bank expansion applications to encourage them to lend in their
communities. 72 According to Senator Proxmire, a poor CRA record would be
grounds for denying an application, but this remedy was not mandatory. "We
provided that when a bank wanted to open a branch the regulating agencies
would have to take into account how much they invested locally, and the1
might have this as a decisive consideration under some circumstances."73 AJ1
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example from the legislative history of a formal effort was a state banking regu1ator th t
.
.
t "
a required city banks that wanted to open a branch in the suburbs
~ ~mphasize lending to their inner city areas as a precondition for approval
t e new suburban branch."74

0

w ~s to informal encouragement, Senator Proxmire stated, "the record shows
in: a~e to do something to nudge them, influence them, persuade them to
in :s~ .111 their community."75 The legislative history cites examples of instances
the F tch regulatory persuasion resulted in increased lending.76 In one case,
and leder~l Home Loan Bank Board, responding to complaints that a savings
n· t ?an 111 Washington, D.C. made 99% of its mortgage loans outside the
is net u d h
.
.
.
in h ' rge t e savings and loan to take affirmative steps to increase lend7
ing ~ ere.7 As a result, the savings and loan increased its proportion of lendg in the D' ·
.
in th . . tstnct to 20%.78 According to the Senate Report, other branches
feet ,,e ~tstnct were able to make 80% of their Joans there with no "adverse efma:· t us the "Bank Board's suggestion that the [savings and loan ] take affi.rap tve ~teps to publicize the availability of credit to city residents was
propnate under the circumstances . ..."79

Opposition to the CRA

ba~e opponents of the CRA, including the heads of three of the four federal
the ng regulatory agencies,80 had several objections to the CRA. Primarily,
eq:a aiued t.hat the CRA was or would lead to credit allocation, and they
Sen te credit allocation with credit quotas. During the Senate Hearings,
of cat~~ Tower stated, "This proposal would, as I read it, provide for a scheme
R.ep~:t it}Uocation... ." 81 According to the opposition statement in the Senate
free fl ' The enactment of this Section would have adverse effects upon the
'cred· ow of capital within our economy, and 'a rose by any other name' is still
it al!ocat'ion.'"82 Accord.mg to Senator Morgan, the CRA:
IS

·

a significant step in the direction of credit allocation by the Con~~e.ss of the United States. If bills of this nature are pushed to their
r hmate conclusion, then the day will come when a financial institumay be forced to make an unsound loan in a specific location in
or er to meet its quota of loans in a given locality. 83

10;

!::~~~: ~ugar

stated, "This perennial attempt to provide credit allocation, to
the b . Ylaw some reason why loans must be made at the penalty of losing
usmess, is simply a gesture in futility."84 Senator Tower stated, "I do not
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rein:~stment ratio.99 They also argued that the law would burden banks with
~dditional paperwork. JOO They believed that voluntary efforts to increase lendmg were preferable and already underway.101 Opponents argued that the CRA
was unnecessary because other federal laws, such as the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the various provisions
of the federal banking laws that required banks to meet the convenience and
nee~s of their communities, prohibited redlining. 102
. Fmally, recognizing that one purpose of the CRA was to increase lending
Ill redlined neighborhoods, the CRA's opponents claimed it would have the
?Pposite effect. 103 It "would .. . have the adverse effect of causing a reduction
Ill ~redit availability in these areas which we are trying so desperately to revitalize."104 They argued that the CRA would deter banks from entering areas in
need of revitalization for fear of the obligation to meet local credit needs. 105
In a letter to Senator Morgan, former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns
state?, "to the extent that this or any other sanction should prove effective in
causmg credit to flow substantially into an area on the basis of non-market
~orc~s, entry by depository institutions into other similar areas would likely
e discouraged." 106 Similarly, Senator Schmitt stated:
The requirement that financial regulatory agencies allocate credit
under this or any other scheme can have adverse effects. By forcing
financial institutions to make loans of dubious quality, the Congress
would easily convince financial institutions to close branches in decaying neighborhoods and thus, lead to further economic and social
decline in these areas.107
Finally, opponents argued that the CRA's additional paperwork and bureaucracy would further discourage banks from opening branches in redlined
areas.108

Response to the CRA's Opponents
CRA supporters denied that it allocated credit, and in making this denial
that the CRA would influence banks to lend more in redlined
neighborhoods. The Senate Report states:

co~firmed

Charters have never constituted licenses to ignore local credit needs.

The~efore, the Committee rejects the assertion that this Title allocates
er.edit. It simply underscores the long-standing obligation to an institution's local service area implicit in existing law. 109
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Amendments to the CRA
Congress made nine significant amendments to the CRA or other banking
laws on . d'f
t
six 1 ferent occasions. Congress intended the first five amendments
;h refine and strengthen the CRA's influence over bank lending decisions .
net~e of these five amendments influence banks to lend more in redlined
s· ~ borhoods by expanding CRA-related public disclosure requirements. The
t:r £and seventh amendments strengthened the CRA by expanding it to cover
we onnation of financial conglomerates. The eighth and ninth amendments
erekadopted to weaken the CRA's influence. The eighth am endment requires
ban
sa d
ninth n community groups to disclose CRA agreements they make and the
fa t reduces the frequency of CRA examinations of small banks with satisc ory
b
or etter CRA records.

FIRREA Amendment
In the F'
·
. .
f
i 989 ("
inancial Institut10ns Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act o
bank· FIRREA''), 121 Con gress amended the CRA to require that the federal
Uaf tng agencies disclose to the public their written CRA performance evaltons ofb k
.
.
wh· h
an s, the CRA ratmgs they assigned to banks, and the facts upon
ingtc the ratings were based.1 22 Prior to this, the written evaluation and ratfon:ere confidential. Congress intended public disclosure of the CRA perPubliance evaluation reports to strengthen CRA enforcement "by allowing the
tion c to know both what regulatory agencies are telling depository instituinsti: a~d what the community reinvestment records of particular depository
Pos Uhons are." 123 Congress intended this amendment to reiterate the pures of th CRA .
.
hou .
e
, tighten CRA standards, and influence banks to make more
toe Stng, small business, and small farm loans. 124 The amendment "will help
nsure
· l mstttut10ns
· · ·
· communities
· · across our N at10n
· w1·11 remain
. that fi nancia
m
FI~l~ an~ active members of the very communities they serve." 125
Con
/\s legislative history also provides guidance about the types of credit
Congress ~as especially interested in influencing banks to make available. 126
gress ind·
d
.
. 1
emph .
tcate that CRA performance evaluat10ns should place specia
modeas is ~n a bank's record "of serving the housing credit needs of low- and
need rate-income persons, small business credit needs, small farm credit
the ~~nd rural economic development."121 Thus, FIRREA's amendments to
their . '.among other FIRREA provisions, "return [ed] savings and loans to
0
inco rtginal purpose, mortgage lending, including for low- and moderateme people." 128
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er d"
b e It unions, presumably because these fin ancial institutions, in turn, could
e counted on to help m eet th e credit n eeds o f redlined n eighborhoods.

Riegle-Neal Amendment
of ~~:art of.the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficien cy Act
4, which allowed banks to open bra nch es in more than o ne state,
C
a ongress amended the CRA to require the federal banking agencies to prepare
in:eparate CRA performance evaluation for each state in which a bank with
erstate b ranch es h as at 1east one bran ch. 137 Congress passed this
· am en d 111
deent ~o alleviate concerns that banks would use interstate banki ng to siphon
hoPosits from new states in which they opened b ranches to make loans in their
of ~e states. 13s Congress stated that this provision ensures that the principles
not f,e CRA would be followed in interstate banking.139 "(C] ommunities need
of ear that increasing geograph ic opportunities for banks will deprive them
no~~eded capital. ... These provisions are designed to en sure that banks will
Stat J~st vacuum up deposits in some States and reinvest them in other
es. ' 140

GLBA Amendments

Ste;h~

Gramm-Leach-Billey Act of 1999 ("GLBA''), which repealed the Glassthe ~a Act and certain provisions of the Banking Act of 1933,141 and amended
had ank Bolding Company Act of 1956 and other federal banki ng laws that
nes Prohibited b anks from engaging in the securities and insurance busises, 142 al
ame d
so am ended the CRA and other related laws.143 Three CRA-related
nes n men ts prohibit banks from engaging in the insurance or securities busiC~s unle~s they received at least a satisfactory rating on their most recent
term ex:arn111ations, require banks and community groups to disclose th e
natios of CRA agreem ents they enter, and limit the frequency of CRA examia co ns of small banks.144 These CRA-related provision s of the GLBA reflect
mpro ·
new b . rnise between supporters of the CRA, who hoped to extend it to th e
hopedusin~ss~s in which banks could engage,1 45 and Senator Phil Gram m, who
abilit to ~ 1 rn1t the CRA's influen ce.1 46 As such, the GLBA's effect on the CRA's
D Ydto influen ce banks to lend in redlined neighborhoods is m ixed.
nan ~
the GLBA, a bank holding com pany ("BHC") m ust become a fibus~a holding company ("FHC") to en gage in the securities or insurance
bank esses,. b.ut a BHC is not permitted to form an FHC unless all of the BHC's
subsidiaries received at least satisfactory ratings on their m ost recen t

t
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Conclusion
The legislative history of the CRA shows that in passing the CRA, Congress
intended to influence banks to lend more in LMI, minority, and inner-citY
neighborhoods. Congress passed the CRA in light of evidence that banks had
redlined these neighborhoods and exported their capital elsewhere. In light of
this, the CRA has a dual purpose-to end redlining and to increase lendiJJS
in redlined neighborhoods. Supporters of the CRA made clear, however, that
while it was intended to influence banks to lend more in such neighborhoods,
the CRA was not intended to create a system of government-imposed credit
allocation. With two exceptions, amendments to the CRA and related ba1¥
ing laws generally strengthened the CRA's influence, primarily through i11'
creasing the amount of information available about bank lending and
requiring the federal banking agencies to focus on home mortgage, small busi·
ness, and small farm lending when evaluating banks for CRA compliance.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE

CRA

Introduction
c~e~ecting congressional intent as expressed in its legislative history,

the
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ee:xp .c1tly
. st a tes t h at banks have an obligation to meet credit
:crhcitly ban credit allocation This suggests that the federal banking agen c1es1 m
c
·
.
.
. ay entorce the CRA in a way that broadly defines the affirmative obligation
on
b
k
d'
II
.
T
an s to meet credit needs but narrowly defines ere 1t a ocat10n.
c d? e CRA states that banks have an affirmative obligation to help meet the
· local communities including LMI neigh
· b or h ood s, w1'th out
s re it. needsof th e1r
apecifying how much a bank must lend. The CRA requires the federal banking
· mdividual
·
· record sofh elpi genc1es to exam me
banks periodically to assess thelf
ng
to
meet
d
'
·
·
fo
ere it needs, to publish an evaluation report- meIu din g a ratmgr
each
b
nk
'd
.
a li
a , and to take the bank's record into account when cons1 ermg an
PP
cation
bY th e bank to expand. Members of the public
· can fil e comment WI·th
th
e
agencies
th
· because
th b
on ese applications. The agencies can deny an applicanon
e ank h
.
.
by . fl
~s not met its CRA obligations. The CRA thus democratizes capital
co In uencmg banks to lend more to redlined commun ities and by giving these
nun~nities a voice in bank lending decisions. But the CRA does not do this by
ocatmg d'
.
.
do
ere it. The CRA does not impose specific lending targets on banks. It
~~~l ~
available
en g quotas or specify the amount of credit. b anks are to make
tain
' to whom, for what purpose, or on what terms. The CRA does not conmandatory penalties for a bank that fails to meet community credit needs.
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